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UNITED STATES v. DAVIS: A JUDICIAL PANACEA FOR DIVIDEND
EQUIVALENCY IN THE CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATION
Since the pioneering of the dividend equivalency test with respect to
corporate stock redemptions, tax attorneys representing dosely-held cor-
porations have found it exceedingly difficult and at times financially disas-
trous to predict the outcome of a specific federal court's interpretation and
application of the dividend equivalency provision. Instead, lawyers' have
been forced to wander in the wilderness, and this has highly curtailed
their advisory role for taxpayer-clients. This uncertainty and confusion
has manifested itself in a vast log of case law, so diverse in its holdings as
to paralyze the attorney in matters of corporate stock redemptions. Re-
cently, the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis" significantly dealt
with the absolute confusion in this area and fashioned a panacea for the
courts which will likely remove much of the tax attorney's paralysis also.
There is little doubt that Davis will prove to be one of the most crucial
federal tax decisions in many years, and to the tax attorney for a closely
held corporation, it may prove to be a bible.
This note will focus upon this judicial panacea from the standpoint of
a closely-held corporation. In detail, it will examine the full scope of
dividend equivalency in the pre-Davis era, analyze the Davis decision,
and evaluate the effect that Davis will have upon the future of dividend
equivalency. Finally, the note will suggest some of the problems that
still remain in this troublesome area.
I
SECTION 302(b) (1) IN THE PRE-DAV7IS ERA
A. The Vast Confusion in the Area
The search for the meaning of the phrase "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" with reference to corporate stock redemptions 2 has posed one of
the most troublesome tasks in the history of federal tax law. The elusive
answer to this problem has caused federal courts across the country great
bewilderment. The Tax Court has called the problem "exasperating;" '
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has called the problem "vex-
ing"; the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has echoed the problem
as "nightmarish";5 and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
referred to it as "the morass created by the decisions." Yet the courts
I United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(b)(1).
8 Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71, 76 (1960).
4 Bradbury v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 111, 114 (Ist Cir. 1962).
5 United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496,499 (5th Cir. 1958).
6 BaIlenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1962).
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have been constrained time and time again to apply this nebulous test
and determine whether a corporate redemption of stock will be treated
as capital gain to the taxpayer or ordinary income.
The statutory scheme for the taxation of stock redemptions is contained
in Section 302 of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954. Briefly, Section 302(a)
provides that the redemption shall be treated as a distribution in "pay-
ment in exchange for the stock" if any of the four paragraphs of Section
302(b) apply.7 If a stock redemption can qualify under any of these
paragraphs, the amount received shall be treated as a return of capital and
the excess over the basis of the stock will be taxed at capital gain rates.
However, if the stock redemption cannot qualify under any of the
four paragraphs, Section 302(d) provides that the redemption is to be
taxed in accordance with Section 301 which prescribes the general rule
for taxing distributions to shareholders. Under Section 301(c)(1) and
by its reference to Section 316, distributions of corporate property to
shareholders are treated as dividends, taxable as ordinary income to the
extent of the corporation's accumulated earnings and profits.
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Section 302 (b) lay down precise guidelines, or
"safe harbors," for taxpayers seeking capital gains treatment. However,
Section 302(b)(1) creates an imprecise and enigmatic standard which
has prompted vast confusion in tax litigation. Much of this confusion
has centered around the vexing question as to the extent the "business
purpose" attending the redemption is to be considered in determining
whether the redemption is "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
Seven courts of appeal have considered this issue, and at least four
distinct attitudes have been postulated towards the significance to be ac-
corded the business purpose of a redemption. Only the second circuit
has accepted without qualification the position of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, which has become known as the "strict" net effect test,
that business purpose is immaterial in a determination of dividend equiva-
lency.8 Two other circuits, the ninth and tenth, have applied a so-called
"flexible" net effect test, under which a legitimate business purpose of the
redemption is considered as a factor militating against dividend equiva-
lence.' The eighth and fifth circuits have had a third approach, which
treats the question of dividend equivalence as entirely one of fact while at
the same time holding that a bona fide business purpose does not require a
7These four paragraphs apply when the redemption is: (1) "not essentially equivalent to a
dividend;" (2) a substantially disproportionate redemption of voting stock; (3) in complete
termination of the shareholder's interests; or (4) in connection with certain railroad reorgani-
zations.
8 Sce McGinty v. Comm'r, 325 F.2d 820 (2nd Cir. 1963); Hasbrook v. United States, 343
F.2d 811 (2nd Cir. 1965); Levin v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 521 (2nd Cir. 1967).
0 Kerr v. Comm'r, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964); Tabery v. Comm'r, 354 F.2d 422 (9th Cir.
1965); Comm'r v. Berenbaurn, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966).
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holding for the taxpayer. 10 It has been unclear which rule applied in the
first and fourth circuits where the courts have vacillated between "flexible"
and "strict" net effect. 1
The sixth circuit has reflected yet another approach. It expanded the
"flexible" net effect test beyond the business purpose attending the re-
demption. If there was a bona fide business purpose attending the issu-
ance of the stock, and redemption of that stock was part of the pre-con-
ceived plan of issuance, then the redemption is not "essentially equivalent
to a dividend.' 2
Another problem existing with respect to dividend equivalency has
posed similar conflict among the courts. This question centers upon
whether the constructive ownership provisions13 apply in determining
dividend equivalence under Section 302(b)(1). Section 1.302-2(b) of
the Treasury Regulations 14 explicitly provides that constructive stock own-
ership under Section 318(a) is one of the factors to be considered in de-
termining dividend equivalency. This principle has been unquestionably
accepted by four circuit courts of appeal.' 5 However, the first circuit has
retreated from this position by declaring that the imposition of the attri-
bution rules is "not inflexible" and that a showing of discord may over-
come their application. 16 Moreover, the Tax Court has taken the liberal
position that at its discretion the attribution rules need not be applied. 7
In the midst of this confusion, United States v. Davis" emerged to re-
solve the conflict with respect to business purpose and the attribution rules
and to shed some further light upon the test of dividend equivalency.
Although many substantial problems remain, the Davis case is highly
significant in establishing some semblance of uniformity so that a tax-
payer may safely foresee the potential tax consequences before a redemp-
tion is undertaken.
10 Heman v. Comm'r, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 1958).
11 The first circuit first adopted the "flexible" net effect test, but recently appeared to be
working toward the second circuit's view. Compare, Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir.
1954), with Bradbury v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962). The fourth circuit, in con-
trast, initially seemed to approve the "strict" net effect test, although in dicta, but in a more
recent decision apparently changed its mind. Compare, Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d
192 (4th Cir. 1962), with Comm'r v. Estate of Antrim, 395 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1968).
12Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
13 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 318(a)(1).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1954).
15 Levin v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 521 (2nd Cir. 1967); Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d
192 (4th Cir. 1962); Comm'r v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966); Davis v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
16 Bradbury v. United States, 298 F.2d 111, 116-17n. 7 (1st Cir. 1962).
'
T Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 429 (1966).




In 1920, the Supreme Court declared that pro rata stock dividends
do not constitute taxable income.:9 This principle spawned a new tax
avoidance technique whereby a corporation could avoid dividend tax treat-
ment by distributing earnings to its shareholders in two transactions--a
pro rata stock dividend followed by a pro rata redemption. The redemp-
tion carried with it the benefit of capital gain treatment.20 Yet the dear
result of joining these two transactions was to provide the same economic
consequences as a simple dividend.
In response to this new tax avoidance device, Congress enacted Section
201(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921. It provided:
A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if after the distribution
of any such dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem its
stock at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and
cancellation or redemption essentially equivalent to the distribution of a
taxable dividend, the amount received in redemption or cancellation of the
stock shall be treated as a taxable dividend. . .. (Emphasis Added)
This statute was amended in 1924 to operate whether the redemption
preceded or followed the stock dividend.22  The Revenue Act of 1926
eliminated altogether the necessity for a stock dividend, extending the
rule to all stock redemptions:
If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock
was issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to
make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part
essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount
so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock . . .shall be
treated as a taxable dividend.as
This dividend equivalence test was later adopted in Section 115(g) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,24 and today survives as Section 302(b)
(1) and Section 346(a) (2) of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 dealing re-
spectively with "stock redemptions" and "partial liquidations."25
The question of what constitutes dividend equivalency squarely con-
fronted the draftsmen of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In an
10 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
20 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(a) (6) and (b), 42 Star. 232-33.
21 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228-29.
22Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(f), 43 Star. 255.
23Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Star. 11.
24 1nt. Rev. Code o f1939, ch. 289, § 115(g), 52 Stat. 497.
2GINT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 302(b)(1) and 346(a)(2). The tax status of § 302(b)(1)
stock redemptions are determined at the shareholder level, while the tax consequences of a §
346(a)(2) partial liquidation is determined at the corporate level. Nevertheless, both techni-
cally involve corporate distributions in redemption of stock. This note will concentrate upon
dividend equivalency with respect to § 302(b)(1) with occasional references to dividend equiva-
lency in the context of § 346(a)(2).
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effort to eliminate "the considerable confusion which exists in this area"
and thereby to facilitate tax planning,20 the authors of the new Code
sought to provide objective tests to govern the tax consequences of stock
redemptions. As a result, the House of Representatives intentionally
passed Section 302 of the tax bill without "essentially equivalent" lan-
guage. Rather it provided "safe harbors" whereby a taxpayer could safely
determine whether he would receive capital gains treatment 2
It was the Senate Finance Committee which restored the language
of dividend equivalency by adding what is now Section 302(b) (1) to
the Code. The Committee explained its actions as follows:
While the House bill sets forth definite conditions under which stock may
be redeemed at capital gain rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily re-
strictive, particularly, in the case of redemptions of preferred stock which
might be called by the corporation without the shareholder having any
control over when the redemption may take place. Accordingly, your
committee follows existing law by re-inserting the general language indi-
cating that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full
payment in exchange for stock if the reaemption is not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend.28
Thus, Section 302(b) (1) was codified, erecting a labyrinth in which the
judiciary would time and again find itself.
At the same time that Section 302 was being structured, the draftsmen
of the Code were facing another problem. Tax avoidance had been per-
fected among small family-owned corporations prior to 1954 through a
clever manipulation of corporate funds in and out of the hands of family
members.2 9  To deal with this problem, Congress enacted Section 318
(a) (1) (A) which provides that:
For purposes of those provisions of this subchapter to which the rules
contained in this section are expressly made applicable ...lain indi-
vidual shall be considered as owning the stock owned ...by ...his
spouse... and ... his children, grandchildren, and parents.30
These so-called "'attribution rules" of constructive ownership were ex-
pressly made applicable to corporate stock redemptions by Section 302
(c) (1) "in determining the ownership of stock for purposes of this sec-
tion."31 Since Section 302(b)(1) speaks in terms of dividend equiva-
26 H.R. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 35 (1954); U.S. CODB CONG. & AD. NEwS 1954,
4025.
27 These "safe harbors" were the conditions now found in 302(b)(2) and (3) of the 1954
Code.
28S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 44-45 (1954); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1954, 4675.
29See the legislative history behind enactment of the attribution rules in 1954; H.R. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1954 at 4061.
30 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 318(a)(1)(A); The atribution rules were also developed to
deal with constructive stock ownership among partners to a parmership, beneficiaries to an
estate, trustees to a trust, and 50% controllers to a corporation.
31 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(c)(1).
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lency rather than stock ownership, the question has persisted whether the
attribution rules are applicable in matters of dividend equivalency.
C. Net Effect or Dividend Equivalency
The most frequently enunciated test applied by the courts in an effort
to identify dividend distributions is the so-called "net effect" test which
had its birth in Flanagan v. Helvefing.3 2 There the court said: "But
the net effect of the distribution rather than the motives and plans of the
taxpayer or his corporation, is the fundamental question in administering
Section 115(g) (Section 302(b) (1) of the 1954 Code)." However the
term "net effect" adds neither complete clarity nor certainty to this trouble-
some area, for it is merely a paraphrase for "essentially equivalent."' 4
Thus the courts have been forced to unravel this tangling web of uncer-
tainty through a factual case by case approach. Some of the factors which
the courts have contemplated in applying the "net effect" test include:
(1) Was a bona fide business purpose present?
(2) Did the shareholder or the corporation initiate the redemption?
(3) How much earnings and profits were available in the corporate sur-
plus?
(4) What was the past dividend record of the corporation?
(5) Did the redemption cause a substantial change in ownership or
control?
(6) Was there a dislocation of relative shareholder interests?
(7) Was there a contraction of corporate operations?
(8) Was there a continuation of profitable operatons?
(9) Were the proceeds from the redemption in the same amount had
the money been distributed as a dividend, hypothetically?
(10) How much time lapsed between the issuance and the redemption of
the stock? and
(11) What special circumstances existed, if any, at the time of distribution?35
In the end, the courts must weigh all the facts and circumstances to de-
termine dividend equivalency. However it appears that certain factors
have received greater emphasis than others. As a direct result, two diver-
gent theories of the "net effect" approach have been applied. These are
most often referred to as the strict "net effect" test and the flexible "net
effect" test.
1) Strict "Net Effect"
This approach places its emphasis upon a hypothetical dividend analy-
sis. Confronted with a section 302(b) (1) problem, the courts hypoth-
32 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
331d. at 939-40.
34 Comm' v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1954).
35 1 IsRTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL. INcOME TAXATION, § 9.100, at 268-69 (Rev. Ed. 1969).
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esize a situation where the specific corporation under judicial scrutiny does
not redeem any stock, but instead declares a dividend for an amount equal
to that which has changed hands through the alleged redemption. Then
it must examine the situation after the hypothetical dividend has been
hypothetically distributed and compare it with the actual facts of the case
when the stock was redeemed. If the results from the hypothetical divi-
dend and the actual stock redemption are essentially the same, the redemp-
tion is "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
The approach in its purest form expressly rejects the business purpose
of the redemption as a meaningful criterion in determining dividend
equivalency. However, even the strict "net effect" test recognizes that
the redemption cannot be viewed in a complete vacuum. "... . [I]n evalu-
ating the effect of the redemption on the future relationship between the
parties, it also seems appropriate to consider whether the redemption is
part of a broader plan."36
In Hasbrook v. United States,2 7 the taxpayer, owner of 98% of the
voting stock in WCAX Radio, Inc. (Radio) and 59.8% of the voting stock
and 27% of the perferred, non-voting stock in Mt. Mansfield Television,
Inc., (Television) received a cash distribution from Radio in payment
for all of the taxpayer's shares in Television. The court stated that the
primary considerations in a hypothetical dividend analysis were: (1)
whether the alleged redemption resulted in a pro rata distribution and (2)
whether the alleged redemption generated any change in basic shareholder
relationships of ownership or control. Operating under these considera-
tions, the court held that the distribution was "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" inasmuch as the distribution had been pro rata to the sole owner
of Radio stock, and the taxpayer continued after the distribution to hold
exactly the same proportion of the common stock of Radio and Television
which he had held before the distribution. Moreover, the taxpayer hadn't
actually parted with any of his preferred shares in Television since after
the transaction was completed he still held, for all practical purposes, the
same shares through his ownership of the stock in Radio.
Similarly, in Levin v. Commissioner,'8 the taxpayer, owner of 484
shares 9 of a family-owned corporation through which she also received a
$7,800 yearly salary, had all her shares redeemed so that her son could
gain control of the corporation.40  After the redemption the taxpayer
remained as a token director, receiving a reduced salary of $1200 per year
26 28 J. oF TAXAMION 346 (1968).
3
7 Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2nd Cir. 1965).
28 385 F.2d 521 (2nd Cir. 1967).
39 The remaining shares of voting stock in the corporation were held as follows:
Joseph Levin, brother of the taxpayer---485 shares
Jerome Levin, son of taxpayer-331 shares




and $7000 annually as distributions in redemption of the stock. In ana-
lyzing the taxpayer's position before and after the redemption, the court
concluded that the redemption was "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
Pursuant to an application of the attribution rules, it was clear that the
taxpayer had not actually parted with any corporate ownership or control
inasmuch as the redemption actually generated an increase rather than
decrease in both stock ownership and annual cash payments.4
2) Flexible "Net Effect"
This test embraces in full the methodology of a hypothetical dividend
analysis, but distinguishes itself from the stricter version by giving some,
although not controlling, weight to business purpose. Where the effect of
a redemption is largely that of a pro rata distribution, generating no
changes in basic shareholder relationships of ownerships and control, the
flexible "net effect" test may nevertheless provide capital gains treatment
if there is a legitimate and compelling business purpose for the redemp-
tion.
The problem as to what constitutes a legitimate and compelling busi-
ness purpose has led to varying interpretations and active disagreement
among federal courts subscribing to the flexible "net effect" approach.
However, it is dear that the federal courts have been willing to accept a
compelling business purpose at both the shareholder and corporate levels.
In United States v. Carey,42 the elimination of the shareholder was a
sufficient business purpose at the shareholder level to sustain a pro rata
redemption from the two 50% shareholders. After the redemption the
retiring shareholder sold his remaining stock to a person who would ac-
tively manage the business, but who could not have afforded the retiring
shareholder's interest had the price not been materially reduced by the
redemption. The court's conclusion that the redemption was not "essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend" was motivated by the absence of a tax
avoidance scheme as well as by the presence of a business purpose that
produced a major shift in ownership.
Likewise in Perry S. Lewis, 45 the owner of an automobile dealer fran-
chise had all his shares redeemed, leaving corporate control solely in the
hands of his two sons, after the automobile manufacturer applied heavy
pressure to elder dealers like the taxpayer to yield their franchises to
younger men. The Tax Court rejected an application of the attribution
41 Before the Redemption After the Redemption
629%o-voting stock ownership 100%-voting stock ownership
(combined stock of taxpayer (stock of Jerome)
and Jerome) $8200-total cash payments
$7800-total cash payments
42289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
43 47 T.C. 129 (1966).
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rules which would have made the taxpayer constructive owner of 100%0
of the shares of stock in the franchise and concluded that the business
purpose for the redemption was sufficient to sustain capital gains treat-
ment.
At the corporate level, in Jones v. Griffin,44 the redemption of pre-
ferred stock to improve the corporation's credit position was a sufficient
business purpose to avoid dividend equivalency. There the redemption
of preferred stock issued at a 6% annual interest rate alleviated a yearly
mounting debt to shareholders that threatened the existence of the corpo-
ration. Removal of this impediment permitted the corporation to obtain
a bank loan at the rate of 2 % annual interest which in turn would ef-
fectuate a substantial saving and the prospects of greater flexibility in its
fiscal operations.
In Bradbury v. Commissioner,45 the corporation, faced with the alter-
native of modernizing its saw mill operations or perhaps being forced out
of competition, desperately needed a bank loan to finance construction of
the new mill. A bank promised to furnish the loan only if a major
shareholder first discharged indebtedness owed to the corporation. To ac-
complish this, the corporation chose to redeem a number of his shares in
cancellation of his indebtedness. In admitting that a compelling and le-
gitimate business purpose for the redemption existed, the court neverthe-
less concluded that without more the redemption was "essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend." More recently in United States v. Davis,46 at the ap-
pellate level, a similar attempt to procure a government loan amounted
to a substantial business purpose which by itself rewarded the taxpayer
with capital gains treatment.
II
SECTION 302 (b) (1) AS INTERPRETED IN
UNITED STATES v. DAVIS
In prospective, United States v. Davis grapples with all the same divi-
dend equivalency problems that had endlessly beset the courts in the pre-
Davis era. Are the attribution rules applicable to Section 302(b)(1)?
Is a bona fide business purpose a meaningful criterion in a determination
of dividend equivalency? If not, what criteria are relevant? Davis took
a positive stand on the first two questions and hinted at a possible answer
to the third question. As a result Davis presents compelling law for the
future of Section 302 (b) (1) stock redemptions.
The facts of Davis mirror many of the stock redemption cases, par-
44 216 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1954).
4298 F.2d 113 (st Cir. 1962).
46 408 1F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
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ticularly that of Commissioner v. Berenbaum.47  In 1945, the taxpayer
Maclin Davis and E. B. Bradley organized the Tennessee Foundry and
Machine Company for the purpose of manufacturing steel castings. In
exchange for section 35148 property transferred to the infant corporation,
Bradley received 500 shares of common stock, and the taxpayer and his
wife similarly each received 250 shares. Having a need for an additional
$25,000 of working capital so that the corporation could thereby qualify
for a $95,000 loan previously negotiated through the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation (RFC), the taxpayer and Bradley were constrained to
either make a loan evidenced by a subordinated deferred note or to pur-
chase additional stock.
Bradley was unable or unwilling to invest additional capital but in-
sisted upon retaining 50% of the voting power. As a result, the only
methods of raising the additional capital considered by the taxpayer were
the purchase by him of preferred, non-voting stock or the taking of sub-
ordinated debentures in exchange for the loan. Taxpayer chose the former
from a balance sheet standpoint, and thereafter 1000 shares of Tennessee
Foundry preferred stock at a par value of $25 per share were duly au-
thorized and issued wholly to the taxpayer. At that time it was agreed
among shareholders that the corporation would redeem all 1000 shares of
the preferred stock as soon as the RFC loan had been fully repaid.
Thus shortly, after incorporation, the outstanding shares were held as fol-
lows:
SHAREHOLDER COMMON PREFERRED
E. B. Bradley 500
Macin P. Davis 250 1,000
Edith U. Davis 250
In 1952, the taxpayer purchased Bradley's 500 shares of common stock
in the corporation and distributed them equally between his son M. P.
Davis, Jr. and his daughter Edith D. Whiteman. Consequently, the then
current capitalization of the corporation was distributed as follows:
SHAREHOLDER COMMON PREFERRED
Maclin P. Davis 250 1,000
Edith U. Davis 250
M. P. Davis, Jr. 250
Edith D. Whiteman 250
On September 23, 1962, after final payment on the RFC loan had been
made, Tennessee Foundry's board of directors resolved to redeem the tax-
payer's preferred shares in accordance with the original understanding.
As a result, on October 1, 1963, the taxpayer surrendered the certificate
representing 1000 preferred shares of Tennessee Foundry capital stock and
was paid $25,000.
47 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966).
4 8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351.
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When the taxpayer failed to report the $25,000 received by him as
income, the Commissioner assessed a deficiency. Upon payment of the
deficiency, Macin Davis initiated a suit for a refund in the United States
District Court of Tennessee.
A. Davis in the District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals
There was little disharmony in the opinions of the United States
District Court of Tennessee49 and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit,r° as the taxpayer incontestably won the first and second rounds of a
three-round bout with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Concep-
tually, both courts reasoned that the primary purpose of the net effect test
was to prevent a tax avoidance scheme, and that where there was a
legitimate business purpose for the corporate stock redemption, the attribu-
tion rules should not be applied mechanically to transform that legitimate
purpose into the design of tax avoidance.
However, the thrust of Davis in the lower courts covertly harbored an
expansive extension of the "business purpose" test. Analysis of the facts
quickly reveals the absence of any business purpose for the redemption
itself. Instead, a business purpose, if any exists, appears to be engrained
in the need for an RFC loan and, as a result, materializes in the wake of
the stock issuance rather than the stock redemption. It would appear to
be inscruitable that the redemption had no better purpose than to vivify
the terms of the original understanding.
Even though the federal courts had in the past reserved application of
"flexible" net effect to only those taxpayers with a legitimate business pur-
pose for the stock redemption, the U.S. District Court of Tennessee and
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit exhibited a touch of judicial
chicanery by extending business purpose to the stage of stock issuance.
This maneuver was quietly executed by a simple declaration that the
stock redemption was inextricably bound up in a pre-conceived plan to
obtain working capital for the infant corporation, and that as a result the
redemption was affected with a legitimate business purpose.
However, this argument was highly tenuous and myopic when squarely
faced with the mandate of Section 302(b) (1). Initially it must be rec-
ognized from the statutory language that the only facts to be taken into
account are those surrounding the stock redemption. Thus an inquiry
into the design of stock issuance, even though such design contemplates
a future redemption, would not be germane to the statutorily circumscribed
test.
Moreover, the "business" reason for the loans appears to be nothing
more than a minimum investment of risk capital. The fact is that the
49 Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
50 Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
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funds advanced in exchange for both common and preferred stock were
advanced for the same "'business" reason as is the equity of any corporation
-to provide necessary capital.
If the mere fact that a given investment was made reluctantly and only
because the investment was necessary to get the business started is enough
to avoid dividend equivalence upon the redemption of the stock associated
with that investment, virtually all redemptions by closely-held corporations
would qualify for the treatment claimed here, and the statutory rules gov-
erning distributions to shareholders of such corporations would, as a prac-
tical matter, be suspended.5 1
The taxpayer, Maclin Davis, had already withstood two, somewhat
shaky, rounds with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and it appeared
that he was home free after waging battle in the sixth circuit. How-
ever, on October 13, 1969, the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, and one round remained to be fought.
B. Davis in the Supreme Court
The third round was a technical knockout for the Commissioner as the
Supreme Court truncated arguments with respect to the applicability of the
attribution rules and business purpose to Section 302(b) (1). In doing
so, the focus was upon the legislative history of the respective provisions
and what the Court regarded as their common-sense interpretations.
Against the weight of authority, the taxpayer had argued that the at-
tribution rules made applicable "in determining the ownership of stock for
purposes of this section"5' 2 are inapplicable with respect to Section 302
(b) (1) inasmuch as there is no explicit reference to stock ownership.
The court abated this porous argument with one equally as weak, but in
doing so was bolstered by the plain language of Section 302(c), the pur-
pose and history of the attribution rules, and the future effectiveness of
this anti-tax avoidance device.
Dismissing the absence of an explicit reference to stock ownership,
the Court emphasized the plain language of the statute as compelling an
application to all of Section 302. It was contended that this was in ac-
cord with the decisions of courts of appeal, a longstanding treasury regu-
lation, and the opinion of the leading commentators. However, the insipid
nature of the argument avoids the statutory language barrier in need of
surmounting-whether the mandate of Section 302(c) was intended to
encompass Section 302(b)(1), an area generally considered unrelated to
ownership of stock.
For further statutory substantiation, the Court evaluated the purpose
of the attribution rules and indicated that they were designed to provide
a dear answer to a difficult tax problem.
51 Brief for Petitioner at 29, United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).52 IT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(c).
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When that provision was added in the Senate, no purpose was evidenced
to restrict the applicability of Section 318(a). Rather, the attribution
rules continued to be made specifically applicable to the entire section, and
we believe that Congress intended that they be taken into account when-
ever ownership of stock was relevant.53
However, again the Court instilled probative character in negative evi-
dence to reach the conclusion that the attribution rules were intended to
be non-restrictive. Furthermore, the Court's language undercuts the pro-
bative weight of their judgment. Their conclusion "that Congress in-
tended that they be taken into account wherever ownership of stock was
relevant," was not nor never has been in dispute. Rather the inquiry
should have focused upon whether ownership of stock is relevant to divi-
dend equivalency. Only in this way could the taxpayer's argument have
been properly disposed.
Notwithstanding, the posture of the Court's logic was somewhat en-
hanced by a reliance upon the policy value posed in the future effective-
ness of the attribution rules. On this level, the court reasoned:
... it was necessary that the attribution rules apply to Section 302(b) (1)
unless they were to be effectively eliminated from consideration with re-
gard to Section 302(b) (2) and (3) also. For if the transaction failed to
qualify under one of those sections solely because of the attribution rules,
it would according to taxpayer's argument nonetheless qualify under Sec-
tion 302(b) (1).5
Even this argument is somewhat farfetched, for it seems to overlook the
difficult standards exclusive of constructive ownership that form the life-
blood of dividend equivalency. In any case, it would appear that the de-
cision with respect to the attribution rules was fashioned solely upon the
fear that non-application to Section 302(b) (1) would "nullify its explicit
directive" 55 and thereby facilitate tax avoidance.
Just as unconvincingly, the Court utilizes legislative history to dissi-
pate the business purpose argument. Without deciding whether business
purpose was relevant to dividend equivalency in pre-1954 tax law, the
Court commenced its probe into legislative history with the report of the
Senate Finance Committee, who had added the dividend equivalency pro-
visions to the House bill. The Senate Finance Committee had originally
criticized the House bill, passed without what is now Section 302(b) (1),
as ". . . unnecessarily restrictive, particularly in the case of redemptions
of preferred stock which might be called by the corporation without the
shareholder having any control over when the redemption takes place."150
53 United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1970).
54 Id, at 307.
n5d. at 307.




From this brief explanation, the Court reasoned that the absence of an
indication that the purpose behind the redemption should affect the result
was persuasive evidence that no such construction was intended.
However, the key to Davis probably rests in the Court's reference to the
Senate purpose behind the 1954 version of Section 302 (b) (1).
Your committee further intends that in applying this test for the future
that the inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of whether or not
the transaction by its nature may properly be characterized as a sale of
stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation.57
The Court ruled that this passage demonstrated a legislative rejection of
past court decisions that had been motivated by the presence or absence of
a tax avoidance motive. Instead the legislature intended to reject busi-
ness purpose "by making the sole inquiry relevant for the future the nar-
row one whether the redemption could be characterized as a sale ... "'
However, again the Court is toying with linguistics. Irrespective of
whether you characterize a redemption as a sale or as a non-dividend dis-
tribution, you are nevertheless confronted with the recurring problem
whether factors irrelevant to the basic criteria should be permitted to ef-
fect or even resolve a Section 302(b) (1) controversy. The legislative
history fails to fill the statutory vacuum evident in this area.
The most sensible rationale would have been an open admission that
the new rule was required on policy grounds to end the turmoil prevalent
in this area. However, such matters are often not open to the Court
when confronted with legislative history. In any case, the Court probably
preferred what appeared to be a more substantial and durable legal ra-
tionale, and thus chose the overly vague language of Section 302(b) (1)'s
legislative history.
If the Davis decision has any redeeming feature it is the simplification of
a tangled case law, both as to what constitutes a valid business purpose
and as to whether a 'corporate' purpose can be distinguished from a 'stock-
holder' purpose in close corporations. In any event, it would seem that
simplification should not require such a strained statutory interpretation.59
C. The Aftermath and a Portent for Dividend Equivalency
The effects of Davis should be felt throughout the business community
as closely-held corporations will likely attempt to regroup their forces and
find new means of achieving capital gains treatment.
Initially, the most obvious effect of Davis will be to eliminate the
"flexible" net effect or business purpose test from federal tax law. This
will elicit a swift and radical change in many of the circuits, inasmuch
57 Id. at 234, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1954 at 4870.
59 2 RABKIN & JOHNsON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE, TAxATION, 24.02 at
2416-417 (1970).
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as the majority of them had accepted the "flexible" approach or some
variation thereof. Consequently, "the business purpose of a transaction is
irrelevant in determining dividend equivalence" 60 under Section 302(b)
(1).
Yet the demise of the "flexible" net effect test has other far-reaching
effects. It suggests that the Court is attempting to draw a line beyond
which business considerations cannot enter into a determination of divi-
dend equivalency. If this analysis is correct, then Davis strips the net
effect test of all components except the so-called "hallmarks of a divi-
dend"-substantial change in basic shareholder relationships and a non
pro rata distribution. Other considerations utilitarian in the past such as
contractions in corporate operations, the past dividend record of the cor-
poration, continued profitable operations of the corporation, and other spe-
cial circumstances existing at the redemption are drained of their vitality
with respect to dividend equivalency. The reason for this is quite simple.
Parallel to the test of business purpose, these considerations relate to the
good intentions or tax avoidance motives of the taxpayer or the corpora-
tion in carrying out the redemption. However, dividend equivalency is
more concerned with whether a transfer of property from a corporation
to its shareholders causes a change in relative economic interests or rights
of the stockholders. This question cannot be meaningfully pursued by
an approach which places value upon the past dividend record of the
corporation, for example, a consideration relative only to tax avoidance
motives. Thus Davis has in all probability accomplished a major job of
spring housecleaning with respect to net effect so as to eliminate all con-
siderations except the "hallmarks of a dividend."
Furthermore, the rationale and language of Davis may prove to play
a significant role in the future of Section 302(b) (1). Up to this time,
the courts have chosen to focus upon the transfer of stock from the per-
spective of a dividend analysis. Of course, the "hallmarks of a dividend,"
emerging from this have been scrutinized to debunk the invalid claims
of taxpayers. However the language of Davis that the inquiry of Section
302(b) (1) "will be devoted solely to the question of whether or not the
transaction may properly be characterized as a sale of stock by the re-
deeming shareholder to the corporation" may cause some courts to redirect
their inquiry under Section 302(b) (1) given the proper set of facts. The
sale language may result in a Uniform Commercial Code argument that
centers upon the question whether any phase of the redemption resulted
in an actual passage or transfer of title to property, rather than the more
conventional "hallmarks of a dividend" analysis. If the facts in a particu-
lar case indicate the transfer of title to property consanguineous to the
redemption of stock, the redemption may not be "essentially equivalent
60 United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 312 (1970).
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to a dividend" even though it is itself pro rata and does not affect sub-
stantial shareholder relationships of ownership and control. The potential
linguistical problem has already shown signs of development in the Tax
Court's recent indication of some willingness to accept literally the sale
language of Davis.61
In the Estate of William F. Runnels,62 the Tax Court was given the
first opportunity to examine and apply the new Davis rule. In 1963, Lou
Ella Runnels and William Runnels, owners of 47.5% and 52.5% respec-
tively of Runnels Chevrolet, Inc., contracted for construction to begin on
a building located on their property. All construction costs were incurred
by the corporation, but payments in turn were charged on the corporate
books to Lou Ella and William as accounts receivable for a total amount
of $68,122.87. In 1964, the corporation redeemed 167 and 184 shares re-
spectively from Lou Ella and William and credited their accounts in the
amount of $68,122.87, thereby extinguishing their indebtedness.
Reinforced by the Davis language, the taxpayer astutely argued that
the transaction was a sale of the building by the corporation to Lou Ella
and William in consideration of some cash and some stock. However the
Tax Court wisely skirted the potential issues raised by this argument by
holding that there could be no sale of the building to the taxpayers inas-
much as the building had been owned by them from the start, and the
money had merely been loaned from the corporation to finance its cost.
With the taxpayer's argument derogated, the court proceeded to decide the
case on the established principles of a pro rata distribution. Since Lou
Ella and William owned 47.58% and 52.42% of the corporate stock re-
spectively after the redemption, the redemption was substantially pro rata
and therefore capital gains treatment must be denied. Although the
Runels case will not be highly significant in federal tax law, it neverthe-
less is valuable in its emphasis upon the sale of stock inquiry as the key to
Davis and its recognition by implication that a taxpayer's sale argument
may overcome dividend equivalency where the sale has more merit than
in the Runnels set of facts.
A third effect of Davis will be to effectively eliminate Section
302(b) (1) in family owned close corporations or one-man corporations.
From the standpoint of family corporations, the applicability of the attri-
bution rules will in most cases foreclose the use of Section 302(b) (1)
since after their application, most redemptions will be pro rata. Of course
this development is not revolutionary. Most of the courts have in the
past subscribed to the applicability of the attribution rules with regard to
dividend equivalency. It was only the exceptional situation where a court
exercised its discretion and restraint in the matter. Yet the attribution
0l Estate of William F. Runnels, 54 P-H Tax Ct. 541 (1970).
,02 d.
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rules do not dose the door entirely upon family corporations since their
applicability is statutorily limited to the spouse plus one step in the di-
rection of ancestors (parents) and two steps toward descendants (children
and grandchildren). Thus one can avoid the attribution rules by distri-
buting such portion of one's interest as one wants within the family struc-
ture to a son-in-law, brother, sister or nephew.a However, once the at-
tribution rules are appropriate and the result is the emergence of a single
shareholder, the mandate of Davis is quite dear:
Where a taxpayer who is the sole stockholder, after application of the at-
tribution rules, causes part of his shares to be redeemed by the corpora-
tion, such redemption is always "essentially equivalent to a dividend."64
Although loopholes still exist in the attribution rules to permit Section
302(b) (1) capital gains treatment with respect to the family owned
close corporation, Davis ensures that such treatment will not be available
to the one-man close corporations (by virtue of the attribution rules or not).
Moreover, Davis may prove to play a crucial role in the shaping of
federal tax law with respect to corporate reorganizations. According to
Section 354(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, there is a non-
recognition of gain or loss "if stock or securities in a corporation a party
to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, ex-
changed solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another
corporation a party to the reorganization." However Section 356 relaxes
this stern rule that the exchange must be "solely" for stock or securities.
If the taxpayer receives "boot" as well as non-recognition property, his
gain, if any, is to be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the
boot.
The amount of gain to be recognized having been determined under
Section 356(a)(1), the provisions of Section 356(a)(2) then determine
whether taxation shall be accorded capital gains or dividend treatment.
Section 356(a) (2) provides that the taxpayer's gain must be recognized as
a dividend to the extent of his ratable share of post-1913 earnings and pro-
fits, if the exchange has the "effect of the distribution of a dividend."
"As a result of some imprecise statements in Commissioner v. Estate
of Bedford,65 it was assumed for many years that Section 356(a) (2)
automatically converted any recognized gain into dividend income, to the
extent of the distributing corporation's earnings and profits, where the
taxpayer continued as a shareholder after the exchange." 66  This "auto-
63 See, U.S.C. 9TH INsTnTUTE 89 (1957).
64 United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041, 1042 (1970).
65325 U.S. 283 (1945).
66BI .E AND EusTICE, IEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPoRATIoNs AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 592 (2nd Ed. 1966). However, it appears that there may be a dispute over whether
the language of Estate of Bedford is imprecise or overly broad. For the latter position, see
HuRwrrz, BusINEss PLANNING 401 (1966).
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matic dividend" test was an unsatisfactory result, particularly from the
facts of the Bedford case where cash was distributed in a recapitalization
to discharge arrearages in preferred dividends. Thus, several of the lower
courts have retreated from Bedford's "automatic dividend" test.6 7
In accordance with some of the leading commentators, it has been
suggested that the phrase "has the effect of a distribution of a dividend"
as utilized in Section 356(a) (2) should be interpreted as employing the
same test as dividend equivalency under Section 302(b)(1)_.68
"Although there is no explicit statutory coordination between the
stod redemption rules of Section 302 and Section 346 and the boot dis-
tribution rule of Section 356(a) (2), the principles developed in inter-
preting Section 302 and possibly Section 346 can be helpful in reaching a
satisfactory result under Section 356(a) (2).""9
The Davis case expressly cites Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford as
relevant law that under the essentially equivalent provision of Section
115(g) (1) of the 1939 Code, it may have been improper for the courts
of appeal to rely on "a business purpose for the redemption" and "an
absence of the proscribed tax avoidance purpose to bail out dividends at
favorable tax rates." 70  This citation might suggest to many of the fed-
eral courts that the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" test was meant
to operate in the area with which Bedford dealt-the boot distribution
rule of Section 356(a)(2). If such a suggestion is adequately pursued,
Davis may result in the complete erosion of Bedford's "automatic divi-
dend" test and a supplantation by the Davis test with respect to boot
distribution in corporate reorganizations.
Furthermore, Davis may prove to have an effect upon the accumulated
earnings tax provisions of the Code, Sections 531-537. Pursuant to the
statute and the 1969 amendments to it, any corporation "formed or availed
of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its share-
holders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earn-
ings and profits to accumulate instead of being distributed as a divi-
dend," 71 shall pay an accumulated earnings tax of 27 % of accumulated
taxable income not in excess of $100,000, and 38 % of accumulated
taxable income in excess of $100,000.72 "The fact that the earnings and
profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reason-
able needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid
67 Sce Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. C1. 1958); Hawkinson v.
Comm'r, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956).
0 8 BITTKER AND EusTIcE, supra note 66.
C0 Id.; also sea Shoulson, Boo; Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L.
REV. 573 (1965).
70 397 U.S. 301, 310 (1970).
7 1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 532(a).
72 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 531.
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the income tax with respect to shareholders. ' '7 3 These provisions impose a
severe financial penalty upon those corporations who fail to heed the
statutory warning; and therefore, tax attorneys must be particularly sensi-
tive to these provisions in which advisory role to closely-held corporations.
Prior to Davis, many closely-held corporations attempted to utilize
the stock redemption device as a means of distributing surplus income
to shareholders at capital gains rates. These attempts were sporadically
successful, thanks largely to the "business purpose" test. However, Davis
effectively defeated this tax avoidance device. As a result, it is likely
that, after Davis, closely-held corporations will both constrict the number
of redemptions as well as the payment of dividends so as to avoid the
harshness of dividend tax treatment. If this course is followed, many
closely-held corporations will unknowingly find themselves paying a
double penalty-the 27 % and 38 % accumulated earnings tax paid at
the corporate level as well as the dividend tax paid at the shareholder
level upon the ultimate distribution of the earned surplus as dividends.
It is crucial that closely-held corporations and their tax consultants
be aware of this pitfall so that in avoiding the Scylla of Davis, they do
not cast themselves into the Charybdis of the accumulated earnings tax.
This avoidance may best be accomplished by tailoring its accumulated
earnings only to the "reasonable needs of business" as defined by Section
537. Interpretation of Section 537 will probably provide a focal point
for future litigation in the area of the accumulated earnings tax. There
can be little doubt that such future litigation is an offspring and long-
range effect of the Davis ruling.
A final effect of the Davis decision will be a proliferation of corporate
attempts to obtain a Section 162 deduction for the "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenses of a redemption with a compelling business pur-
pose. In Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,4 a closely-held corpora-
tion, whose business and success revolved around the use of certain patents
from a patent licensing agreement, found itself on the verge of bank-
ruptcy when Smith, a 50% shareholder, drew heavily over a period of years
from Five Star's treasury, causing the corporation to slide into great debt.
The owner of the patents threatened to cancel the patent licensing agree-
ment unless Smith was removed from the corporate picture as a share-
holder. Confronted with a struggle for corporate survival, Five Star ob-
tained a judicial order for the sale of Smith's stock, and at the sale Five
Star became the purchaser of its own stock. When the corporation
sought an "ordinary and necessary" business deduction for expense in
redemption of Smith's stock, the court held:
Corporation's payment to 50% stockholder to terminate his interest in
73 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533(a).
74 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
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corporation was deductible as ordinary and necessary trade or business
expense, where removal of stockholder would permit the corporation again
to use assets for income production by freeing its management from un-
warranted fetters.7 *
The thrust of Five Star is that a compelling business purpose for redemp-
tion of stock may be sufficient to achieve a Section 162 business deduction.
Thus, blocked by the mandate of Davis in obtaining capital gains treat-
ment for shareholders for the redemption of stock with a compelling
business purpose, closely-held corporations will likely argue their right to
a Section 162 business deduction under the Five Star rationale. However,
it is just as likely that the Commissioner will argue that the abatement
of a business purpose exception under Davis was intended to fashion an
expansive remedy for the mass confusion and inequality of treatment
among jurisdictions subscribing to a variety of business purpose tests.
Allowance of a Section 162 business deduction for redemptions with a
compelling business purpose would reopen Pandora's Box in derogation of
the letter and spirit of Davis, by once again permitting the courts to fashion
their own definitions and applications of a compelling business purpose.
Of course, in counter-argument, closely-held corporations will contend
that Davis must be confined to the area of dividend equivalency, and that
Section 162 is guided by its own unique set of values. Irrespective of
which argument is more easily digested, the conflict presents an interesting
and significant ground for future tax litigation.
III
PROBLEMS THAT STILL REMAIN
A. The Attribution Rules
Although Davis seems to resolve the problems posed by the attribu-
tion rules with respect to dividend equivalency, this resolution may prove
to be shortlived. It is irrefutable that in some cases, application of the
attribution rules works great hardship and inequity. In the past, a few
courts faced with this realization have construed their application to Sec-
tion 302(b) (1) as discretionary.76 Davis effectively puts to rest such an
argument. However it may well come to pass that the Davis decision
will signal the carrying out of a selective group of non-statutory excep-
tions to the attribution rules.
A few of the courts have notably suggested that family hostility or
estrangement and the complexity of preferred stock situations may render
the application of the family attribution rules unwise.7 This suggestion
75 Id.
70 Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 429 (1966); Estate of Arthur Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
7 7 Levin v. Comm'r, 385 P.2d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1967); Estate of Arthur Squier, id.
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has also manifested itself in the texts of some of the leading commenta-
tors.
78
Of course, a family hostility exception would be predicated upon the
fact that the purpose in enactment of the attribution rules-namely, to
prevent tax avoidance and evasion of the complete redemption test in
Section 302(b) (3), while at the same time providing definitive rules for
the guidance of taxpayers 79-- would not be served where bona fide hostil-
ities had driven the family apart. After all, there is nothing sacred about
the family unit once the parties are estranged. On the other hand, it
might be argued that it is not the proper role of the court to become
embroiled in what appears to be a family dispute.
A preferred stock exception has been suggested because of the com-
plexities of multi-class capitalization and the language of Section 302(b)
(1)'s legislative history.
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock may
be redeemed at capital gain rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily re-
strictive particularly in the case of redemptions of preferred stock which
might be called by the corporation without the shareholder having any
control over when the redemption may take place.80 (Emphasis Added)
This legislative history has at times been interpreted as suggesting that
preferred stock presents special problems where voting common is not
also simultaneously redeemed that must be dealt with in an often uncon-
ventional fashion. Armed with these arguments, a taxpayer may very
well raise the issue of these exceptions to the attribution rules. Up to
the present time, the courts have refused to recognize specific non-statutory
exceptions to the attribution rules.81 The courts, however, may find it
necessary to carve such exceptions in the future.
B. Multi-Class Capitalization
After the application of the attribution rules, the facts of Davis pro-
vided an irreducible and elementary situation for a further application
of the principles of dividend equivalency. Maclin Davis had been the
constructive owner of the entire common and preferred capital stock is-
sued by the corporation, and consequently, the only rational characteriza-
tion of a distribution in partial redemption of his preferred stock would
be that of a dividend.
78 BITrTKR AND EusTIcE, supra note 66 at 292.
7 9 H.R. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., , (1954); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1954,
4061.
8
o Supra note 28.
8 1 See, however Estate of Arthur Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), where the court apparently dis-
regarded an application of the attribution rules to an estate's proportional ownership of a close
corporation because ".... the record herein reveals a sharp cleavage between the executor and
members of the Squier family." at 955.
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Limited to its facts, Davis presents compelling law where a taxpayer
is the owner of common stock in a single-class capital-structured corpora-
tion and where a taxpayer is the 100% owner (constructive or not) of
the entire stock in a corporation having multi-class capitalization. How-
ever, where a taxpayer is not a 100%6 owner of the entire stock in a
corporation having multi-class capitalization, the problems become mani-
fest. It is this ocean which needs to be charted and sailed upon by the
Supreme Court.
The redemption of preferred stock in a multi-class capital structure
does present special problems. The Senate Finance Committee was well
aware of these problems when it talked of its purpose in drafting what is
now Section 302(b) (1).
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock may
be redeemed, at capital gains rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily
restrictive particularly in the case of redemptions of preferred stock .... 82
Stock which is nonvoting, limited and preferred as to dividends and
in liquidation is closely consonant to a debt security. This relationship
presents interesting incongruities since debt capital, assuming no problem
of thin capitalization, 3 may generally be repaid free of tax regardless of
the pro rata character of the payment. Of course, this result is precluded
where the capital is labeled "'preferred stock" and the distribution is
pro rata. The vast discrepancy in results precipitated by the labels at-
tached and the absence of adequate guidelines for distinguishing the use
of each label causes one to stop and contemplate whether the retirement
of preferred stock should be governed by the same principles as repayment
of debt-namely, a tax-free recovery of invested capital.8
At the very least, however, non-litigious taxpayers should be offered
a "safe harbor"-a nonexclusive, arbitrarily defined area of debt-by re-
ference to which, together with their lawyers, they could plan the capitali-
zations of dosely-held corporations confident that certain payments to them
would be treated as a return of capital with interest income.8 5 It appears
that this result may be forthcoming in the light of Section 385 (a), an
addition to the Internal Revenue Code by the Tariff Reform Act of
1969,81 which delegates the power to issue guidelines in the debt-equity
area. 7 Creation of this "safe harbor" by the Treasury would probably
obviate the use of preferred stock as a capitalization device.
82Supra note 28.
83 BITKER AND EUsTIcE, supra note 66 at 125.
84 See, SURRAY AND WARREN, FEDERAL INcoNME TAXATION 1551 (1960).
85 See, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and Dis-
location in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARV. L REv. 1695 (May 1970).
80 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 613 (1969), codified at ITr. REv. CODE of 1954,§ 385.
87 For an excellent analysis of this new statute, see supra note 85.
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Furthermore, the pro rata standard has implications not present in
the case of a pro rata redemption of common stock. Whether a distribu-
tion in redemption of preferred stock is pro rata with respect to preferred
stock alone is irrelevant. Rather, the focus has centered upon whether the
common and preferred stock together are held in substantially the same
proportions before and after the alleged redemption.8 8 The complexity of
this inquiry is proliferated when several classes of both voting and non-
voting preferred stock are present.
Moreover, in the redemption of a pro rata portion of a shareholder's
preferred stock, a shareholder's right to recover his invested principal and
to receive all future preferred dividends is pro tanto reduced. These ele-
ments are not affected in a pro rata redemption of common stock. Thus,
the mere fact that a distribution in redemption of preferred stock is pro
rata with respect to preferred shares is not an adequate gauge of dividend
equivalency. The crucial question upon which the courts should focus
where common and preferred shares are held in equal proportions is
whether the redemption of preferred stock is actually a distribution in
retirement of preferred stock or a disguised dividend on common stock.
If the redemption is the former, capital gains treatment should be ac-
corded; while if the latter, the distribution should be taxed as a dividend.
In Himmel v. Commissioner,89 a federal court had a rare opportunity
to deal with the problem of dividend equivalence in a multi-class capital
structure with significant result. There the taxpayer loaned money to his
jointly-owned corporation which later discharged the debt by issuing two
classes of preferred stock, one voting and the other non-voting. The tax-
payer made a gift of his common stock to his sons, but retained control
of the corporation through his voting preferred stock. When the corpora-
tion acquired some surplus cash, it redeemed all of the non-voting pre-
ferred and a part of the voting preferred. However, the taxpayer again
remained in control of the corporation through constructive ownership
of his sons' shares.
The court recognized that in single-class capitalization, the net effect
of a redemption may be adequately gauged by a pro rata standard since
all rights exist in proportion to the shares held. However, in multi-class
capitalization, the pro rata standard is not enough inasmuch as additional
classes will most often be preferred shares without voting rights and with
limited rights to participate in earnings and liquidations (to the extent
of capital contributed). Consequently, the court indicated that the re-
demption of some preferred shares may cause more heterogeneous changes
in a shareholder's package of total rights than would a redemption of
common stock.
8 8 Treas. Regs. § 1.302-2(a) (1955).
89 338 F.2d 815 (2nd Cir. 1964).
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In rejecting the lumping together of all different classes of stock, the
court suggested that the proper test was that of the "hallmarks of a divi-
dend"-was there a pro rata distribution of earnings and profits and was
there any change in basic shareholder relationships of ownership or con-
trol. Focusing upon the latter test, it held that the distribution to the
taxpayer was "essentially equivalent to a dividend."
The Himmel case suggests three significant theories with respect to
dividend equivalency in a multi-class capital structure.
1. where voting shares are redeemed, a determination of net effect per-
mits a grouping together of common and preferred stock, if only to
gauge the impact on voting power.
2. where non-voting shares are redeemed, all classes of common and
preferred shares should not be lumped together for purposes of de-
termining reduction in ownership, since joinder is not relative to any
significant aspect of the complex of shareholder rights.
3. the net worth test (changes in relative shares of net worth attributable
to each shareholder) is the proper inquiry in multi-class capitalization.
The dearth of redemption cases involving the complex of a multi-class
capital structure has prevented the erosion, modification or augmentation
of the Himmel decision. Nevertheless, in the near future the Supreme




United States v. Davis90 appears to be one of the most significant fed-
eral tax decisions in recent years. Its mandate may seriously affect de-
cision-making at many levels in the closely-held corporation. Notwith-
standing, it is now patent that the redemption device in conjunction with
Section 302(b) (1) may not be used as a vehicle to distribute what is
actually or constructively a dividend at capital gains rates even though a
compelling business purpose for the redemption exists.
With the abatement of a business purpose exception, closely-held cor-
porations and their shareholders must rely more upon the "safe harbors"
of Sections 302(b)(2) and (b)(3) for capital gains treatment. Section
302(b) (3) probably provides the surest and safest harbor for capital
gains treatment, inasmuch as the attribution rules are made expressly in-
applicable where the redemption is in complete termination of a share-
holder's interest. Thus, had Mrs. Levin in Levin v. Commissione z l not
retained a token directorship and salary with her family-owned corpora-
tion, the attribution rules would have been effectively neutralized and
00 United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
91 385 F.2d 521 (2nd Cir. 1967).
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the redemption of all of her capital stock in the corporation would have
received capital gains treatment.92 Future taxpayers should give Levin
more than a quick glance when planning a Section 302(b) (3) redemp-
tion.
The judicial panacea provided by Davis could operatively encourage
the profitable closely-held corporation to go public. Although many small
corporations desire to keep corporate control in the hands of a closely-knit
circle, it may well be that the tax advantages in avoiding the attribution
rules and the pro rata standard will operate to overcome the initial skepti-
cism of publicly-owned status and control.
In summation, Davis will have a multitudinous effect upon many areas
of the federal tax law. At the present, its greatest asset is the unraveling
of many of the enigmatic characteristics of dividend equivalency and the
assumption of a new degree of consistency in this troubled area. How-
ever, many problems will persist in this vexing field, and Davis will con-
tinue to play a significant role toward their solution.
Gary Douglas Greenwald
92 According to § 302(c) (2) (A) (i), the attribution rules are not applicable if "immediately
after the distribution, the distributee has no interest in the corporation (including an interest
as director or officer) except as a creditor."
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